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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between party discipline and discretionary spend-
ing with theory and data. We propose a theoretical model in which a politician faces
a conflict between her constituents’ interests and the party line. Party loyalty is elec-
torally costly for the politician and is therefore rewarded by the party leader with greater
amounts of discretionary spending allocated to the politician’s constituency. The more
intense the conflict between the voters’ and the party’s interests, the more grants the dis-
trict receives. Using panel data on party discipline in the U.S. House of Representatives
and federal grants to congressional districts between 1984 and 2010, we provide evidence
that districts represented by loyal legislators receive greater amounts of discretionary
spending. This effect holds only for legislators in the majority party, who may enjoy a
legislative advantage. Districts represented by loyal legislators who face a greater conflict
of interest between following the party and serving their constituents (e.g., Republican
legislators representing liberal-leaning districts) are rewarded to a larger extent.
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1 Introduction
Party discipline commonly refers to the ability of party leaders to influence their party mem-
bers to support the party line on the floor of the legislature.1 In modern democracies, party
discipline is often difficult to achieve because legislators have to respond to local needs that
are sometimes not aligned with the party’s interests. Excessive party loyalty, therefore, may
be electorally costly for legislators. To soften electoral punishment and foster party discipline,
party leaders may reward loyalty. Such rewards can include “favorable committee assignments
and leadership positions, campaign funds, district visits by party notables, federal projects
targeted to a member’s district, expedited treatment for a member’s favorite bills, and invita-
tions to serve as speaker pro tem” (Snyder and Groseclose 2000, p. 194). Narrowly targeted
projects may be particularly effective in influencing legislators’ voting behavior. In 1964, for
instance, American President Lyndon Johnson persuaded Arizona Democrat Carl Hayden to
vote in favor of the Civil Rights Act in exchange for the Central Arizona Water Project that
Hayden’s constituents demanded. Some argue that “without a little pork, Johnson would
have been unable to obtain his [Hayden’s] support.”2
Although several studies have identified party discipline, a great deal of uncertainty re-
mains regarding the relationship between party discipline and the allocation of discretionary
spending.3 The present paper contributes to this line of research by proposing and testing
empirically a novel theory that identifies the condition under which party discipline is likely
to influence government spending. In our model, voters condition a politician’s reelection
on the policy outcome she decides to implement, as well as on the amount of funds she
attracts for her constituency. If the politician (who is purely office-motivated) follows the
party line instead of voters’ interests, the potential electoral punishment can be partly (or
totally) offset by larger spending targeted to her constituency. The party leader, who is in
charge of allocating government spending, offers a contract to the politician conditioning the
allocation of spending on the politician’s loyalty to the party line. In this context, the closer
the policy outcome to the party line, the more loyal the politician is. Our model predicts
that higher levels of party loyalty are associated with greater amounts of targeted spending.
Most importantly, this effect is greater the more intense the conflict of interest between the
party leader’s preferences and the voters’ interests.
To investigate empirically the relationship between party discipline and discretionary
1Henceforth, we use the terms party discipline and party loyalty interchangeably.
2http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/12/opinion/zelizer-the-case-for-earmarks/
3Discretionary spending refers to non-formula grants that have a partisan bias and are targeted to certain
constituencies. Henceforth, we use the terms discretionary spending and pork-barrel spending interchangeably.
2
spending, we use a panel data set of congressional districts in the United States that includes
information on representation and party discipline in the House of Representatives and federal
grants between 1984 and 2010. We focus on party loyalty in legislative voting and use as
a measure of discipline the party unity scores published yearly by Congressional Quarterly.
These scores are based on roll-call votes in which the majority of Democrats oppose the
majority of Republicans, also known as unity votes. Unity scores are calculated as the
percentage of unity votes in which a representative voted along her party line. As for the
type of federal grants, we restrict our main analysis to spending programs that have a large
variation over time within districts and are likely to be allocated according to discretionary
rules instead of objective formulas. Thus, this type of expenditure is more susceptible to
political manipulation and targeting.
The empirical analysis is based on a panel data model that controls for observable char-
acteristics, such as the representatives’ seniority and partisanship, and includes year and
district fixed effects, to reduce the potential omitted-variables bias. The fixed-effects esti-
mates suggest that districts represented by loyal representatives with unity scores above the
party median receive greater amounts of discretionary spending. This effect exists only for
legislators affiliated with the majority party and not for those in the minority. This pattern
might be due to the legislative advantage of the majority party that has greater proposal
power than the minority party.4 According to our results, districts represented by loyal leg-
islators who belong to the majority party receive on average 7% more grants than disloyal
legislators in the same party, or $74.66 per capita more.
We also find empirical support for the hypothesis that legislators whose party line is
not strongly aligned with constituents’ interests are rewarded with funds to a larger ex-
tent. Estimates reveal that conservative-leaning districts represented by loyal Democrats
and liberal-leaning districts represented by loyal Republicans receive nearly $300 per capita
more (or about 25.3% additional funding) than districts where no such conflict exists.
The findings are robust to the inclusion of legislator fixed effects, regional trends, and
several political factors that may be correlated at the same time with the degree of conflict
faced by a legislator and the amount of funds her district receives. In addition, we run placebo
tests that include lags and leads of party loyalty, and we show that only contemporaneous
loyalty significantly influences the allocation of discretionary spending.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the related
literature. Section 3 outlines the theoretical model and derives its empirical implications.
4Although the theoretical model abstracts from such legislative advantage, there is empirical evidence that
provides support for this kind of bias in the U.S. Congress (Albouy 2013).
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Section 4 describes the data and illustrates the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the
estimation results and robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
Our theoretical model contributes to the formal literature on party discipline, which comprises
several approaches. Some researchers have elaborated on informational arguments, pointing
out that strong party discipline informs voters about the future policy of a candidate who,
once elected, cannot deviate from the party’s official platform (Ashworth and Bueno de
Mesquita 2004; Castanheira and Crutzen 2010; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Snyder and Ting
2002). In a similar vein, Grossman and Helpman (2008) defined party discipline as a party’s
ability to induce ex-post adherence to a pre-announced position. Party discipline, therefore,
is a valuable asset for the party leaders because it signals cohesion and thus helps build a
political brand (Cox and McCubbins 1993). In several other studies, party discipline has
been modeled as the ability of the party leadership to control its members in the legislature
such that they vote in line with the party’s ideological position (Colomer 2005; Eguia 2011;
Iaryczower 2008; McGillivray 1997; Patty 2008; Volden and Bergman 2006). In these models,
the party leader’s objective is to discipline party members who might have different ideological
preferences. Diermeier and Feddersen (1998a,b) provided an institutional explanation for
cohesive voting of legislators in parliamentary systems. The authors showed that the vote-of-
confidence procedure common in parliamentary democracies creates an incentive for cohesion
in voting.
Although these studies formally analyzed party discipline, little research has been con-
ducted on the impacts of party loyalty on the allocation of discretionary spending. We are
aware of only one formal study that addresses this question. Grossman and Helpman (2008)
investigate how differences in party discipline affect national spending on local public goods.
In the study’s setting, however, party discipline is modeled as an exogenously given insti-
tutional variable—an “extent of commitment to party platforms” (p. 330). In the present
paper, we endogenize party discipline by modeling explicitly the politician’s and the party
leader’s problems.
This paper also contributes to the empirical literature on party discipline, which has
mostly focused on the political consequences of party discipline. There is evidence of loyal
legislators incurring electoral punishment in the polls (Carson et al. 2010). Some studies have
shown that party lines affect legislators’ voting behavior on the floor of the legislature (Heller
and Mershon 2008; Krehbiel 2000; McCarty and Rosenthal 2001; Rohde 1991; Snyder and
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Groseclose 2000). Barber and Godbout (2014) also found that, in the US, majority party
leaders reward loyalty in roll-call voting with campaign contributions to run in upcoming
elections.
Our paper is also related to the studies on the relationship between legislative repre-
sentation and the geographic distribution of public spending. Atlas et al. (1995) find that
per-capita federal spending is correlated with per-capita representation in the U.S. Senate.
Using data on U.S. transportation projects, Knight (2004) finds that legislators are more
likely to support federal spending the higher their own-district spending and the lower the
tax burden borne. Knight (2008) analyzed the relationship between legislative representation
and the geographic distribution of federal spending. He finds that small U.S. states receive
more funding in the Senate, while large U.S. states receive more funding in the House. In
turn, Albouy (2013) finds that U.S. states represented by the majority party members re-
ceive more federal funds than those represented by members in the minority. More broadly,
this paper contributes to the literature on distributive politics that focuses on the political
distribution of public goods. Most of this literature focuses on four main political factors
that influence the distribution of government spending: core and swing districts (Lindbeck
and Weibull 1987; Dixit and Londregan 1996), partisan favoritism (Arulampalam and Dutta
2009; Brollo and Nannicini 2012), clientelism (Stokes and Brusco 2013), and political budget
cycles (Shi and Svensson 2016).5
Although these studies have empirically investigated party loyalty and the allocation
of federal funds as unrelated topics, evidence for the relationship between party discipline
and discretionary spending is scarce. To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have
addressed this issue, and the results are mixed. Primo and Snyder (2010) find that, for the
years 1957-1970, U.S. states with strong party organizations received less federal spending
than states with weaker parties.6 However, the result is no longer statistically significant once
state fixed effects are included. A negative relationship between legislative party strength
and federal grants would be at odds with the fact that since the early 1990s, the U.S. has
experienced an increase in party cohesion and pork-barrel spending. This pattern is more
consistent with the idea of pork as a reward for party loyalty. Pearson (2008) suggests that
this may be the case: “When party leaders in both chambers finalize the details of major
legislation, they have opportunities to reward loyalty. The increasing number of earmarks
5See Golden and Min (2013) for an extensive review.
6Their measure of party strength is an index constructed by Zeller (1954), who classifies states as those
with strong party organizations and those with weak party organizations. The classification is based on the
results of a survey conducted among experts.
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added in conference committee or during budget summit negotiation may provide limited
opportunities to reward loyalty” (p. 113). This observation is in line with the findings
of Cann and Sidman (2011) who report a positive correlation between party loyalty and
government spending for U.S. representatives in 2002-2009.
We depart from Cann and Sidman’s analysis in several ways. First, our model identifies
the conditions under which party discipline is likely to be highly rewarded (i.e., in the districts
with conflict between the constituents’ interests and the party line). If no conflict of interest
exists, then legislators vote along party lines simply because the constituents’ preferences
are aligned with the party’s. In this case, a positive relationship between spending and
discipline is just a spurious correlation. Second, we expand the time period to the years
1984-2010. This is important because in the 1980s and 1990s, there was a larger number
of Republican representatives in liberal-leaning districts and Democrat representatives in
conservative-leaning districts. Third, to address to the greatest possible extent the potential
bias due to omitted variables, we employ different fixed-effects strategies in contrast to Cann
and Sidman’s random-effects model.
3 Model
Consider a politician who decides on policy x. The set of feasible policies is taken to be the
closed interval [0, l], l > 0. The politician is assumed to be purely office-motivated and to
maximize her reelection probability denoted by Pr (·).
There is a representative voter with bliss point 0 who cares about the policy outcome x
according to the quadratic loss function l2−x2. Therefore, the voter prefers the policy to be
as close as possible to his bliss point 0. The voter also values discretionary spending s that
enters linearly into his utility function
uV (x, s) = l
2 − x2 + s.
One can think of s as specific projects or public goods.
The voter decides on the politician’s reelection. He realizes that the politician wants to
be reelected. Therefore, the politician can be held accountable for the policy outcome and
discretionary spending at the moment of the election. We assume that the voter conditions
the politician’s reelection on the voter’s utility uV (x, s) from policy x and spending s. The
higher uV (x, s), the more likely the voter is to reelect the incumbent. The probability of
reelection is given by
Pr (x, s) = F (uV (x, s)) ,
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where F (·) denotes the cumulative function of a well-behaved continuous distribution with
F ′ (·) > 0.
The politician is affiliated with a political party. The party leader with bliss point l
is policy-motivated. He cares about the policy outcome x according to the quadratic loss
function
l2 − (l − x)2 .
The party leader thus wants the politician to choose a policy as close as possible to the party
leader’s own bliss point l, which we refer to as the party line.7 However, supporting the party
line is electorally costly for the politician as the voter wants the politician to implement a
policy sufficiently close to his bliss point 0. This implies that there exists a conflict of interest
between the voter’s interests (i.e., his bliss point 0) and the party line (i.e., the party leader’s
bliss point l). A larger l makes this conflict between the voter’s and the leader’s interests
more intense.
We assume that the party leader controls the allocation of discretionary spending s ≥ 0
that he can channel to the politician’s constituency (for example, via earmarks).8
The party leader’s utility function is therefore given by
uL (x, s) = l
2 − (l − x)2 − s.
The party leader knows that the politician maximizes her reelection probability Pr (x, s),
which depends on the policy outcome x and on the amount of spending s. Therefore, the
party leader can somehow compensate the politician with spending for supporting the party
line instead of following her constituency’s interests. In other words, the party leader can
reward the politician’s loyalty and discipline with spending channeled to her constituency.
We measure the politician’s loyalty to the party line (i.e., her party discipline) with x. A
larger x means that the politician implements a policy closer to the party line l (and so is
more loyal and disciplined).
The party leader wants the politician to internalize her losses l2 − (l − x)2 from the
implemented policy and so will condition discretionary spending s on these losses. This is
7The assumption that the voter’s and the leader’s bliss points are at the opposite extremes of the policy
space [0, l] is made without loss of generality.
8In the U.S. Congress, party leaders decide when to place bills for consideration and therefore have
opportunities to add a number of earmarks when finalizing the details of major legislation. This suggests
that party leaders have a certain level of power to allocate discretionary spending in their (or their party’s)
interests.
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modeled as an explicit contract that maps any possible policy to the spending allocation:
s (x) = max
[
l2 − (l − x)2 + α, 0
]
, (1)
where α ∈ R is a constant chosen optimally by the party leader. The more loyal the politician
(i.e., the closer x to the party line l), the larger the amount of spending is allocated to her
constituency.
The timing of events is as follows. The party leader chooses α and offers s (x) to the
politician, giving a binding promise of spending conditional on the chosen policy level x. The
politician either accepts or rejects this offer (she is assumed to accept if she is indifferent).9
Finally, she chooses policy x. If she is indifferent between several policies, she picks the policy
preferred by the party leader.10
We analyze this game backwards and turn now to the politician’s policy choice and her
decision whether to accept or to reject the party leader’s offer.
Politician’s policy choice Suppose first that the politician rejects the party leader’s
offer s (x). This corresponds to the case with zero spending in which the probability of the
politician being reelected to her office is equal to
Pr (x, 0) = F
(
l2 − x2) .
The politician chooses x ∈ [0, l] to maximize this probability. Given that F ′ (·) > 0, she
maximizes l2− x2 and thus picks the voter’s preferred policy 0. Her probability of reelection
is equal to F
(
l2
)
in this case.
Suppose next that the politician accepts the party leader’s offer s (x) given by (1). Her
reelection probability is then
Pr (x, s (x)) = F
(
l2 − x2 + max
[
l2 − (l − x)2 + α, 0
])
.
The politician maximizes Pr (x, s (x)) with respect to x. We denote with x (α) the politician’s
policy choice that depends on the party leader’s choice of α. Pr (α) denotes the corresponding
reelection probability. The politician’s maximization problem is analyzed in the Appendix.
The results are summarized in the following lemma.
9Alternatively, one can assume that the party leader offers the politician a small positive compensation
ε > 0 in exchange for her accepting the spending offer when she is indifferent.
10Alternatively, one can assume that the party leader offers the politician a small positive compensation
ε > 0 in exchange for her selecting his preferred policy among the policies to which she is indifferent.
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Lemma 3.1. Suppose that the politician has accepted the party leader’s offer s (x) given by
(1). Then she chooses policy
x (α) =
{
l
2 if α ≥ −12 l2,
0 if α < −12 l2,
(2)
and gets reelected with probability
Pr (α) =
{
F
(
3
2 l
2 + α
)
if α ≥ −12 l2,
F
(
l2
)
if α < −12 l2.
(3)
Lemma 3.1 suggests that a higher α (i.e., a higher amount of discretionary spending)
makes the politician pick a policy closer to the party leader’s bliss point l, l2 instead of 0.
Even though the voter prefers policy 0 to l2 , in the case of a higher α he gets compensated with
discretionary spending and so reelects the politician with higher probability. For α ≥ −12 l2,
F
(
3
2 l
2 + α
) ≥ F (l2).
We next consider the politician’s decision whether to accept or to reject s (x). Comparing
her reelection probability in the case of rejecting, F
(
l2
)
, with that in the case of accepting,
(3), yields that she has weakly higher chances of being reelected in the latter case. Note that
for the case of α < −12 l2, she is indifferent between accepting and rejecting s (x). However,
for the case of α ≥ −12 l2, she strictly prefers to accept s (x). Therefore, for all α ∈ R, she
decides to accept the spending offer of the party leader given by (1). In what follows, we turn
to the party leader’s decision about α that defines the reward for the politician’s loyalty and
discipline.
Party leader’s choice of α The party leader realizes that the politician will accept his
offer and will implement policy x (α) given by (2). The party leader’s utility uL (·) is then
equal to
uL (α) = l
2 − (l − x (α))2 − s (x (α)) =
{
−α if α ≥ −12 l2,
0 if α < −12 l2.
The party leader chooses α to maximize uL (α) and so picks α
∗ = −12 l2. His utility is then
equal to uL (α
∗) = 12 l
2 and is higher than his utility when he makes no spending offer to the
politician (which is 0). The politician gets utility Pr (α∗) = F
(
l2
)
while the voter gets utility
uV (α
∗) = l2, which are exactly equal to their utilities when no spending offer was made
by the party leader. Therefore, in equilibrium, the party leader gets all the gains from the
spending contract and just has to ensure that the politician’s participation constraint binds.
The spending contract is presented in the following Proposition.
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Proposition 3.2. The party leader proposes the following spending contract to the politician
s (x) = max
[
1
2 l
2 − (l − x)2 , 0
]
. (4)
The politician’s discipline and the resulting spending allocation are determined in equi-
librium, and, thus, both are endogenous. However, the model suggests that the two are
correlated. According to (4), the party leader will condition the allocation of discretionary
spending on the politician’s loyalty to the party line x, as well as on the intensity of conflict
between the constituency’s and leader’s policy preferences l. We turn now to the model’s
predictions which are tested in the following empirical analysis.
Prediction 1 : The more loyal the politician is to the party line, the larger the amount of
spending is allocated to her constituency: ∂s∂x ≥ 0 for x ∈ [0, l].
Intuitively, the model suggests that the party leader opts for the loyalty reward that
maps a policy to a spending allocation. The closer the chosen policy to the party line (i.e.,
the more disciplined the politician), the higher the spending is channeled to the politician’s
constituency. Therefore, we expect a positive association between the politician’s loyalty to
her party and the discretionary spending allocated to her home district.
Prediction 2 : The effect of the politician’s loyalty on discretionary spending is larger the
more intense the conflict of interest between the voter’s and the party leader’s preferences:
∂2s
∂x∂l ≥ 0.
This interaction effect between party discipline and conflict intensity reflects the innate
nature of party loyalty. The politician’s support for the party line does not necessarily imply
she is being loyal to the party. In particular, in the absence of conflict between the voter’s
and the party leader’s interests, the politician would face no trade-off. Then, supporting the
party line would be a by-product of following her constituency’s interests rather than a sign
of party discipline and so does not have to be rewarded by the party leader. In turn, a conflict
between the voter’s and the party leader’s preferences leads to a trade-off for the politician.
In this case, there is room for party discipline that has to be rewarded by the party leader.
The more intense the conflict of interest, the larger the trade-off is faced by the politician
and thus the more she will be rewarded for a given level of party loyalty. As a result, not
only does more party loyalty increase the amount of spending allocated to the politician’s
constituency, but it also does so to a larger extent if the conflict between the voter’s and the
party leader’s interests deepens.
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4 Empirical Analysis
In the empirical analysis, we study the relationship between party discipline and the allocation
of public spending using district-level data on members of the U.S. House of Representatives
and federal expenditures for the 1984-2010 period. We restrict the analysis to the House of
Representatives because the Senate is composed of multi-member districts, and it is therefore
hard to clearly relate the behavior of a legislator to the amount of spending her district
receives. In contrast, the House of Representatives is composed of single-member districts.
In what follows, we describe the data and methodology, and then present our results.
4.1 Data
This section reports the data sources and descriptive statistics. Data on federal spending
in congressional districts for the years 1984-2010 come from Dynes and Huber (2015) who
assembled and cleaned the information provided by the Federal Assistance Awards Data
System (FAADS) to examine another issue—namely, the affiliation with the president’s party
and the allocation of federal grants. This information accounts for approximately half of the
federal budget.11 The data we use in this study are at the district-fiscal year level, and the
fiscal years included in our analysis are 1984-2010, with the exception of fiscal years 1993 and
2003, which are excluded from the sample due to congressional reapportionment.12 We focus
our analysis on spending that is susceptible to political manipulation and follow previous
work that classifies spending into high-variance and low-variance programs based on their
coefficient of variation (see, e.g., DeBacker 2011; Levitt and Snyder 1995; Dynes and Huber
2015; Berry, Burden and Howell 2010).13 High-variance spending is commonly associated
with discretionary spending as high-variance spending is usually not formula-based, and it
tends to fund smaller programs that are more susceptible to targeting. All programs with a
11An alternative source, which contains most of the federal budget, is the Consolidated Federal Funds
Report (CFFR). However, CFFR information is at the state level, and this does not allow us to identify with
precision the recipients of federal funds.
12After each decennial census, the number of congressional districts per state is adjusted using the new
population counts while ensuring that each state has at least one district. This process is known as reappor-
tionment.
13The coefficient of variation of each program is computed as follows. The standard deviation of the
program’s outlays across all districts in fiscal year t is divided by the mean of its outlays across all districts in
t and then the mean of this across all years is computed. We exclude from this computation the districts that
cross boundaries with state capitals. The reason is that spending allocated to state capitals is often spread
among several districts. See Dynes and Huber (2015) for further details.
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coefficient of variation greater than or equal to one are classified as pork-barrel spending.14
This is arguably not a perfect measure of pork-barrel spending. However, pure distributive
spending (i.e., earmarks in appropriation bills) is available only at the state level. Aggregating
party discipline at that level would dismiss important information as there is a big divergence
within states. Table 1 shows the five largest programs classified as high-variation spending.
Table 1: Largest high-variation programs in FAADS.
Program
code
Program name % total outlays
14.856 Low Income Housing Assistance 1.05%
93.560 Family Support Payments to States-Assistance Payments 0.87%
10.055 Production Flexibility Payments for Contract Commodities 0.66%
93.770 Medicare-Prescription Drug Coverage 0.55%
84.268 Federal Direct Student Loans 0.49%
The federal budget of a certain fiscal year (FY) is approved during the previous year.
This means, for instance, that the pork-barrel expenditures of FY1993 were passed in 1992 by
legislators elected in the 1990 election. In our sample, discretionary spending to congressional
districts is, on average, $1,066 per capita (in 2010 dollars) per year, and the standard deviation
is $2,062. Federal spending in districts that include state capitals may be noisy, and for this
reason, in our model we include a control variable (Capital) that is one if a district crosses
boundaries with the state capital.
We collect population figures from the U.S. Census to express federal outlays in per-capita
terms. Population at the district level is available only in decennial censuses (i.e., in 1980,
1990, and 2000).15 However, we can obtain an estimate of the district population using the
state population estimates provided yearly by the U.S. Census and dividing them by the
number of congressional districts in each year.16 We then include the population logarithm
as a control variable in all specifications.
We combine the data on federal spending with information on party discipline in the
House of Representatives. Following the previous literature (e.g., Cantor and Herrnson 1997;
Carson et al. 2010), we use party unity scores as an indicator of party loyalty in policy voting.
14This cutoff corresponds to a natural break observed at the lower end of a histogram of the coefficients of
variation. The cutoff used by Dynes and Huber (2015) is 1.0, that used by Levitt and Snyder (1995) is 0.67,
and that used by DeBacker (2011) is 1.2. Moving this cutoff does not significantly change our results.
15http://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html.
16We can make this imputation because all congressional districts within a state are meant to have similar
population sizes.
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These scores are available for each legislator in any given year. They are computed as the
percentage of roll-call votes in which a representative voted “yea” or “nay” in agreement
with her party when the majority of one party voted against the majority of the other
party.17 Data on party unity scores are collected from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac.
As shown in Figure 1, this score was, on average, around 60% by the early 1970s, but it
increased significantly during the following decades and today totals 90%. The blue (red)
horizontal lines in Figure 1 represent the years of a Democrat (Republican) majority. Our
main explanatory variable (Loyal) is a binary variable that equals one for legislators with
unity scores above the median unity score of their party, and zero otherwise. In our sample,
47% of legislators are classified as loyal.
Figure 1: Party discipline and party control in the House of Representatives
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One of the main predictions of our theoretical model is that the effect of loyalty on
discretionary spending is larger the more intense the conflict of interest between the voters’
17Party discipline becomes especially visible in this context of confrontation. During the years 1984-2010,
Democrats and Republicans voted against each other, on average, in 51% of all roll-call votes in the House of
Representatives.
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Table 2: Percentage of representatives who face a conflict of interest
Election year Whole sample Majority party members
1982 28% 38%
1984 24% 33%
1986 25% 34%
1988 25% 35%
1990 26% 36%
1992 28% 37%
1994 22% 18%
1996 20% 14%
1998 17% 10%
2000 17% 10%
2002 14% 11%
2004 14% 9%
2006 16% 25%
2008 18% 29%
preferences and the party line. This should be the case for Republican representatives in
liberal-leaning districts and Democratic representatives in conservative-leaning districts. To
identify such settings of conflict, we first construct a measure of district partisanship. We
do so using presidential election outcomes and computing for each district the average vote
shares of the presidential candidates for the Democratic and Republican parties across each
decennial census. Similarly, we compute national averages.18 Then, our measure of Conflict
is a binary variable that equals one if a Republican legislator represents a district in which
the average vote share of the Democratic party in the presidential elections is above the
national average, or if a Democrat represents a district in which the average support for the
Republican in the presidential elections is above the national average. In our dataset, 21%
of legislators are in this setting. However, this figure varies considerably over the years and
across the parties. Table 2 shows that the percentage of representatives who face such conflict
decreases over time. The percentage of majority party members facing conflict drops from
37% in 1992 to 18% in 1994, when the Republicans took control of the House.
Our econometric specification also includes a broad set of observable political factors.
18Each decennial census (1980, 1990, and 2000) comprises three presidential elections, which we used to
calculate the vote share averages.
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The following variables help identify whether a representative held a leadership position that
could help her attract more funding: Committee Chair, Appropriations Committee, Ways and
Means Committee, and Majority party leadership. These are binary variables that equal one
if the representative is a chair of a committee, a member of the Appropriations Committee,
a member of the Ways and Means Committee, or a member of the majority party leadership,
respectively.
Further, we add two variables to take into consideration the possibility that members with
a certain partisanship have an agenda-setting advantage that helps them secure funding. This
would be the case for members affiliated with the president’s party (Berry, Burden and Howell
2010).19 In addition, to account for different spending preferences across the Democratic
and Republican parties (Ferreira and Gyourko 2009), we include in our regressions a binary
variable that equals one if a representative is Republican.
Seniority may also be an important determinant of the fund distribution as junior mem-
bers are expected to be in a worse position to attract grants (see, e.g., DeBacker 2011). Thus,
we include a dummy variable that indicates whether a representative is in her First term as
well as a Seniority variable that accounts for the number of terms in office.
The political economy literature also suggests that electoral competition influences fiscal
policies (Besley and Case 2003; Besley, Persson and Sturm 2010; Trounstine 2006). In line
with this argument, we include the difference in the vote shares between the winning and
losing candidates in a corresponding state in the last presidential election (State presidential
margin). Moreover, to account for close races, we also add a dummy that indicates whether
the vote margin in the last congressional election was lower than 5% (i.e., the representative
faced a Close election). All these variables (including the unity scores) are constructed using
data from the legislative session in which the budget for a fiscal year is passed (namely, the
preceding year).
Table A.1 in the Appendix summarizes the descriptive statistics of these variables.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
In our baseline specification, we employ a fixed-effects (FE) model of the following form:
yit = βLoyalit +X
′
itΩ + µi + δt + uit, (5)
where i denotes congressional districts and t denotes fiscal years. The dependent variable yit
is high-variance spending per capita, in 2010 dollars (inflation adjusted); δt represents year
19Members of the House majority may also have a legislative advantage. We address this question in Section
4.2.
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fixed effects, and µi refers to district fixed effects, where districts are constant units within
each decennial census to address the complex issue of redistricting. The error term uit is
clustered at the congressional district level to provide consistent estimates; Loyalit is equal
to one if a legislator’s unity score is above her party median. Recall that the budget of a
certain fiscal year t is approved the previous year (t-1). Therefore, the unity scores used to
construct the variable Loyalit correspond to t-1. We aim to estimate the relationship between
party discipline and government spending. Therefore, the coefficient of interest is β, which
we expect to be positive according to our theoretical model.
The vector X
′
itΩ includes a set of district-level variables to control for the political factors
described in the previous section: President’s party, State presidential margin, Majority party
leadership, Committee chair, Appropriations Committee, Ways and means Committee, Close
election, Republican, First term, and Seniority. The only demographic factor for which we
have variation over time within districts is population, and we include it in the logarithms.
Other socioeconomic data (such as unemployment, percentage of elderly people, etc.) are
available only at the district level from the decennial censuses. As these data do not vary
within districts, they are captured by µi.
Further, to test Prediction 2, we include in equation (5) the following interaction term:
yit = βLoyalit + ηConflictit + γLoyalit × Conflictit +X ′itΩ + µi + δt + uit, (6)
where Conflictit equals one when a liberal-leaning district is represented by a Republican
legislator or when a conservative-leaning district is represented by a Democrat. Our model
predicts that loyal legislators who have a priori higher incentives to deviate from the party
line are rewarded with pork-barrel spending to a greater extent. Therefore, we expect γ to
be positive.
Congressional politics studies argue that majority party members have more proposal
power than minority party members (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Albouy (2013) finds that
this translates into larger amounts of spending allocated to the majority party members’
constituencies.20 This result suggests that the capacity to reward loyalty is very likely to
differ across the majority and minority party leaders. To address this issue, we base our
main specifications on a sample that includes only majority party districts. In addition, we
run a robustness check in which we consider only minority party districts.
20Berry, Burden and Howell (2010) also find that, under certain circumstances, majority party members
receive larger amounts of federal funds.
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5 Empirical Results
5.1 Party Discipline and Discretionary Spending
Table 3 presents the fixed-effects estimates for the panel data model in equation (5). We
include year and district fixed effects in all specifications.21 In columns 3 and 6, we add
regional trends that are interaction terms between a linear time trend and dummies for each
of the four regions established by the U.S. Census.22 By including the regional trends, we can
account to a certain extent for the shifts in voters’ preferences that are specific to a certain
region (e.g., some southern regions have become more conservative over the years, while the
Northeast has become more liberal).
The results in columns 1-3 suggest that the districts represented by loyal legislators receive
more discretionary spending. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level,
and the size of the effect remains stable across the three specifications. According to the
estimates in column 3, the districts represented by loyal legislators receive, on average, $74.66
more spending per capita (3.5% of the standard deviation in the outcome variable). This
corresponds to a 7% increase for the average majority district, which receives $1057.97 per
capita. The results in column 3 reveal that most of the control variables have no statistically
significant impact on discretionary spending. The exceptions include districts with contested
congressional elections, districts represented by Appropriations Committee members, and
districts represented by Republicans. They all attract more discretionary spending. Note
that in the case of the districts represented by Republicans, the sign of the coefficient changes
once the regional trends are included.
As a placebo test, we estimate the same model for low-variance spending. This type of
spending is usually formula-based and thus is more difficult to manipulate. Therefore, we
expect no significant relationship between party discipline and spending. The results for this
placebo test are reported in columns 4-6 of Table 3. According to the results, there is no
significant association between party loyalty and low-variance spending, as we expected.
Table 4 presents the heterogeneous effects of party loyalty conditional on the conflict
intensity between the voters’ preferences and the party line. The estimates correspond to
equation (6).
The results in columns 1-3 suggest that districts with loyal legislators receive, on average,
$278.39 per capita more if they are conservative-leaning districts represented by a Democrat
or liberal-leaning districts represented by a Republican. To obtain a meaningful economic
21Recall that by “district” we mean district by census.
22The four regions are the Northeast, South, West, and Midwest.
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Table 3: Party discipline and spending in U.S. congressional districts, 1984-2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loyal 77.31** 75.49** 74.66** -12.49 -10.82 -10.91
(38.09) (37.29) (36.51) (9.85) (9.83) (9.85)
Log population -983.02* -925.78* -147.43 -1974.36*** -1961.77*** -2052.66***
(529.67) (530.12) (749.46) (292.51) (288.44) (334.33)
Capital 260.05 272.47 284.10 245.36 241.31 250.74
(245.93) (248.11) (247.02) (180.91) (180.92) (180.66)
President’s party 497.14*** 99.57 -46.83 -535.61***
(83.64) (106.94) (82.60) (105.21)
State presidential margin 221.82 166.30 -236.73* -298.11*
(274.71) (283.12) (141.20) (156.05)
Majority party leadership -53.21 -67.71 -24.31 -21.36
(76.18) (76.72) (61.06) (51.78)
Committee chair -35.12 -37.83 11.41 12.33
(54.02) (53.67) (27.89) (28.35)
Appropriations Committee 300.06 297.83* -22.30 -24.26
(182.41) (179.60) (25.37) (24.53)
Ways and Means Committee -41.27 -46.45 -29.17 -29.92
(104.67) (104.34) (51.52) (51.54)
Close election 141.74** 143.57** -3.74 -8.34
(54.96) (56.62) (18.62) (18.24)
Republican -735.55*** 470.62** -1801.86*** -330.26**
(149.12) (198.84) (68.45) (129.62)
First term -12.00 -12.79 -30.69* -30.54*
(35.51) (35.79) (18.01) (17.93)
Seniority -12.28 -11.96 -3.59 -3.12
(10.46) (10.40) (2.52) (2.45)
Regional trends No No Yes No No Yes
Adj. R2 0.104 0.111 0.112 0.445 0.446 0.447
Observations 5803 5803 5803 5803 5803 5803
Mean outcome in sample 1057.97 1057.97 1057.97 3682.22 3682.22 3682.22
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications
include year and district by census fixed effects. Dependent variable in columns 1-3 = High-Variance (i.e., discre-
tionary) spending per capita. Dependent variable in columns 4-6 = Low-Variance spending per capita. Loyal = 1 if
the legislator’s unity score is above her party median. Districts represented by minority party members and districts
with multiple occupants are not included.
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Table 4: Party discipline and federal spending: heterogeneous effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loyal 28.90 24.05 24.29 -8.06 -6.21 -6.03
(33.79) (33.04) (33.03) (11.09) (11.14) (11.12)
Conflict -75.05 -88.95 -85.68 -2.03 0.63 1.25
(84.88) (83.76) (84.92) (27.96) (28.08) (28.17)
Loyal × conflict 271.28* 283.15** 278.39** -29.07 -28.76 -30.30
(152.51) (140.59) (137.16) (24.54) (25.06) (24.72)
Log population -919.55* -856.85 -116.72 -1980.74*** -1968.58*** -2056.61***
(539.70) (539.43) (759.35) (289.42) (285.58) (331.56)
Capital 260.51 271.47 282.30 245.31 241.46 250.98
(247.50) (250.20) (248.94) (180.79) (180.75) (180.47)
President’s party 502.17*** 107.17 -47.21 -536.30***
(83.84) (107.27) (82.68) (105.28)
State presidential margin 215.26 169.76 -236.33* -298.41*
(275.06) (283.23) (141.14) (155.95)
Majority party leadership -77.26 -90.98 -21.99 -18.95
(68.73) (68.08) (62.16) (53.10)
Committee chair -38.14 -40.71 11.19 12.13
(53.93) (53.47) (27.95) (28.45)
Appropriations Committee 292.26* 290.42* -21.22 -23.16
(173.51) (170.99) (25.43) (24.62)
Ways and Means Committee -43.34 -48.34 -28.51 -29.27
(103.77) (103.61) (51.23) (51.25)
Close election 154.05*** 155.74*** -4.54 -9.22
(53.75) (55.35) (18.62) (18.20)
Republican -756.31*** 441.73** -1803.01*** -330.28**
(147.84) (201.29) (70.28) (130.50)
First term -9.04 -9.94 -30.96* -30.82*
(35.28) (35.59) (18.02) (17.92)
Seniority -12.61 -12.35 -3.51 -3.04
(10.49) (10.42) (2.54) (2.47)
Regional trends No No Yes No No Yes
Adj. R2 0.107 0.114 0.115 0.445 0.445 0.447
Observations 5,803 5,803 5,803 5,803 5,803 5,803
Mean outcome if Loyal=1 1,098.86 1,098.86 1,098.86 3,658.47 3,658.47 3,658.47
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications
include year and district by census fixed effects. Dependent variable in columns 1-3 = High-Variance (i.e., discre-
tionary) spending per capita. Dependent variable in columns 4-6 = Low-Variance spending per capita. Loyal =
1 if the legislator’s unity score is above her party’s median. Districts represented by minority party members and
districts with multiple occupants are not included. Conflict = 1 for Republican legislators in liberal-leaning districts
or Democrat legislators in conservative-leaning districts.
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impact, this figure should be compared to the average amount of discretionary spending that
loyal legislators in the House majority receive ($1,098.86 on average in our sample). Thus, the
effect of loyalty on spending is increased by 25.3%, which is a large effect that remains signifi-
cant across different specifications. It is remarkable that despite the inclusion of district fixed
effects and regional trends, which remove considerable variation, the coefficients of interest
are statistically significant and meaningful. In columns 4-6, we examine the effects of party
loyalty on non-discretionary spending. As expected, they are not statistically significant.
The result that rewards for party discipline depend on the conflict intensity between the
constituency’s interests and the party line is a novel finding. In our sample, only 21% of
the districts can be classified as districts in which legislators face a large conflict of interest.
During the initial years, the share of districts with such conflict is 23%, while in 2010 this
totals 18%. These figures are smaller if we consider only majority party members. This
finding implies that even though party loyalty is associated with larger amounts of pork-barrel
spending, this effect is mainly observed in districts with conflict between the constituency’s
interests and the party line.
The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 correspond to a sample that includes only the
districts represented by majority party members. Minority party leaders are likely to have a
lower (or null) capacity to affect federal spending. Table A.2 in the Appendix suggests that
there is no statistically significant relationship between party discipline and federal spending
in the districts represented by minority party members.
5.2 Additional Results
Introducing district fixed effects in our specifications helps attenuate the potential bias due
to omitted variables. Some electoral variables may be quite stable over time within a district.
However, other determinants (e.g., the legislator’s ability) may vary once the constituency
elects a new representative. To reduce further the omitted-variable bias, we examine the
relationship between party discipline and discretionary spending holding fixed the legislator
who represents a particular district. Introducing legislator fixed effects drastically reduces
the variation in our main explanatory variable (Loyal) as individual loyalty levels are very
stable over time. Nevertheless, the capacity of loyal legislators to attract federal spending is
likely to change once they switch from the minority to the majority status. Thus, we study
whether the districts represented by loyal legislators are affected to a larger extent by the
switch from minority to majority status.23 To address this issue, we restrict the sample to
23Between 1984 and 2010, there were two changes in the control of the House of Representatives. In 1994,
there was a switch from a Democratic to a Republican majority, while in 2006, there was a switch back to
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representatives who were in both the majority and the minority during their terms in office.
We estimate the following equation
yit = βLoyalit + ψMajorityit + ρLoyalit ×Majorityit +X ′itΩ + νi + δt + uit, (7)
where νi are District by Census by Legislator fixed effects, and our coefficient of interest is
ρ. Moreover, we split the sample based on the conflict intensity and run separate regressions
for representatives who face a conflict of interest between the constituency’s preferences and
the party line (Conflict = 1) and those who do not (Conflict = 0).
This estimation strategy mitigates the omitted-variable problem, but the strategy comes
at a cost. The results have less external validity as we rely on a sample of senior represen-
tatives and discard information from marginal districts in which the incumbents were not
reelected. Moreover, if unobservable factors influenced the spending and the control of the
House, then the results would be biased.
The estimates presented in Table 5 reveal that there is a positive association between party
loyalty and discretionary spending allocated to congressional districts represented by the
majority members. This relationship is positive only for the districts in which representatives
face a conflict of interest and thus have higher incentives to deviate from the party line (see
the interaction term Loyal×Majority party in columns 1 and 2). In contrast, the interaction
term Loyal×Majority party is no longer statistically significant once we restrict the sample
to districts with no conflicts of interest (columns 3 and 4).
Regarding the economic significance of the effects, the coefficient in the first column of
Table 5 is imprecisely estimated. Still, the coefficient has a similar size and the same sign
as the statistically significant coefficient in column 2, which includes regional trends. The
estimates presented in column 2 suggest that a shift from the House minority to the majority
increases discretionary spending by $1,347 per capita when the district is represented by
a loyal legislator who faces a conflict of interest. Since the districts represented by loyal
legislators who face a conflict of interest receive, on average, $2,150 per capita, switching to
majority status increases their resources by 37%.24
The model estimated in equation (7) is very conservative, and very little variation is left
to exploit. Finding statistically significant estimates in such a conservative model suggests
the Democratic majority. The majority switches can be considered exogenous to uit given that the electoral
results in one district are unlikely to cause a national shift.
24The estimates of the baseline model without legislator dummies but with district and year fixed effects
are presented in Table A.3 in the Appendix. The coefficient associated with the interaction Loyal × Majority
party is half the size of the estimates in Table 5 because the sample used in the regressions in Table A.3 is
not restricted only to legislators who serve under a majority and a minority.
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Table 5: Party discipline and spending: legislator fixed effects.
Conflict=1 Conflict=0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loyal -131.23 -120.61 13.54 16.49
(413.01) (422.02) (33.72) (34.30)
Majority party 0.50 2.16 53.39 56.48
(55.06) (57.05) (40.71) (41.43)
Loyal × Majority party 1312.35 1346.64* -29.30 -32.86
(815.94) (792.62) (45.63) (46.15)
Regional trends No Yes No Yes
Mean outcome if Loyal=1 2,150.15 2,150.15 1,036.59 1,036.59
Adj. R2 0.134 0.151 0.093 0.093
Observations 716 716 3394 3394
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,
*p<0.1. All specifications include year and district by census by member fixed effects. De-
pendent variable = High-Variance (i.e., discretionary) spending per capita. Loyal = 1 if
the legislator’s unity score is above the party median. Districts with multiple occupants
and legislators who serve only either under majority or minority are excluded. Con-
flict = 1 for Republican legislator in liberal-leaning districts or Democrat legislators in
conservative-leaning districts. Additional controls added in all models: log(population),
capital, president’s party, state presidential margin, majority party leadership, committee
chair, Appropriations Committee, Ways and Means Committee, first term, and seniority
(as in Table 4).
that these effects exist and that party discipline plays an important role in the distribution
of the federal budget.
5.3 Robustness
The estimates reported in the previous sections provide clear evidence that party loyalty
is associated with larger amounts of discretionary spending allocated to the corresponding
districts. Moreover, this effect is more pronounced in the districts with conflict between
the constituency’s interests and the party line. In what follows, we perform two additional
robustness checks to validate our previous findings.
First, we check whether the heterogeneous effects of party loyalty arise because of the
different levels of conflict intensity and not because of other factors that are correlated with
such conflict. To test this, we include in equation (6) the variable Loyal interacted with
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different potential confounding factors that are correlated with the variable Conflict and
may impact the allocation of public spending. The results are presented in Table 6. A
representative elected in a district with low support for her party is likely to have faced
intense electoral competition and therefore to have been elected in a close election. Thus, in
column 1 we add an interaction term between party loyalty and close congressional elections
(those with a vote margin below 5%). Moreover, Republican-leaning districts are less likely
to elect a representative affiliated with the Democratic party. To control for this fact, in
column 2 we add an interaction term between loyalty and the Republican party affiliation.
Last, in column 3 we include an interaction term between loyalty and the legislator’s vote
margin in the last congressional election. We do so to account for the legislator’s popularity
or competence as it could be that a Republican legislator elected in a Democratic-leaning
district is regarded as a very competent politician, and in this case, her party affiliation
matters less (the same argument holds for a Democratic legislator elected in a Republican-
leaning district).
The interaction terms Loyal×Close election and Loyal×Republican in columns 1 and
2 of Table 6 are statistically significant. Therefore, loyal representatives elected in close
elections attract less discretionary spending to their home districts than those elected in
less competitive elections. Moreover, loyal Republicans bring more pork-barrel spending to
their home districts than do loyal Democrats. Importantly, our interaction effect of interest
Loyal × Conflict remains statistically significant in all specifications, and its magnitude is
similar to the previous results presented in Table 4.
Second, we introduce one lead and one lag of the variable Loyal in addition to the con-
temporaneous effect of loyalty. The results are presented in Table 7. Neither the lag nor the
lead variable has a statistically significant effect. Most importantly, the contemporaneous
effect of loyalty is statistically significant at the 10% level. The result that the lagged vari-
able has no effect on spending discards the possibility of any anticipatory effects. In turn,
the null effect of the lead variable reveals that party loyalty influences the distribution of
discretionary spending and not the other way around.
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Table 6: Party discipline and spending: potential confounding factors.
(1) (2) (3)
Loyal 31.96 90.27** 69.68
(32.64) (44.12) (54.95)
Conflict -99.31 -85.00 -79.77
(84.18) (84.31) (85.86)
Loyal × Conflict 302.68** 237.40* 262.04*
(144.23) (136.48) (133.98)
Close election 218.82*** 153.53*** 145.89***
(66.48) (55.21) (56.40)
Loyal × Close election -171.11*
(97.45)
Republican 455.82** 470.32** 436.76**
(200.28) (202.01) (202.68)
Loyal × Republican -126.35**
(61.47)
Vote margin -0.23
(0.67)
Loyal × vote margin -1.18
(0.80)
Regional trends Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.115 0.115 0.138
Observations 5803 5803 5803
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses,
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications include year and district by
census fixed effects. Dependent variable = High-Variance (i.e., discretionary)
spending per capita. Loyal = 1 if the legislator’s unity score is above the
party median. Districts represented by minority party members and districts
with multiple occupants are not included. Conflict = 1 for Republican legisla-
tors in liberal-leaning districts or Democrat legislators in conservative-leaning
districts. Additional controls added in all models: log(population), capital,
president’s party, state presidential margin, majority party leadership, com-
mittee chair, Appropriations Committee, Ways and Means Committee, first
term, and seniority (see Table 4).
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Table 7: Robustness: lagged and lead loyalty.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loyalt-1 34.23 33.98 33.78 12.56 12.52 10.94
(29.65) (29.67) (28.96) (8.59) (8.55) (8.68)
Loyalt 52.65* 53.55* 51.87* -6.13 -4.84 -4.86
(31.67) (31.50) (30.59) (9.21) (8.98) (9.09)
Loyalt+1 35.51 32.30 32.12 -6.08 -5.57 -5.60
(22.17) (21.37) (21.48) (21.87) (21.88) (22.03)
Regional trends No No Yes No No Yes
Adj. R2 0.064 0.068 0.069 0.512 0.513 0.514
Observations 4117 4117 4117 4117 4117 4117
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All
specifications include year and district by census fixed effects. Dependent variable = High-Variance
(i.e., discretionary) spending per capita. Loyal = 1 if legislator’s unity score is above her party
median. Districts represented by minority party members and districts with multiple occupants are
not included. Additional controls added in all models: log(population), capital, president’s party,
state presidential margin, majority party leadership, committee chair, Appropriations Committee,
Ways and Means Committee, first term, and seniority (see Table 4).
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate theoretically and empirically the impact of party discipline on
the distribution of discretionary spending. In our context, party discipline refers to the ability
of party leaders to ensure that party members support the party line. Following the party line
might be electorally costly for legislators as it may go against their constituents’ interests. In
these instances, the party leaders might have to reward the legislators. One of such reward
is discretionary spending targeted to the legislators’ constituencies. Discretionary grants are
often viewed as unproductive federal spending used to fund targeted projects, which are
sometimes referred to as “bridges to nowhere.” However, the party leaders have certain levels
of power to allocate discretionary grants and thus can use them to influence legislators to
vote along the party line.
We develop a theoretical model in which a politician faces a conflict between the con-
stituents’ preferences and the party’s interests. Following the party line (i.e., being loyal) is
electorally costly for the politician. To offset electoral punishment, the party leader rewards
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the politician’s loyalty with discretionary spending allocated to her constituency. Our model
predicts that party discipline leads to larger amounts of targeted spending. Moreover, this
effect is more pronounced the larger the conflict between the party’s interests and the voters’
preferences.
We test the predictions of our model using district-level data on U.S. federal spending
and party discipline in the House of Representatives over the 1984-2010 period. Our findings
suggest that districts with loyal legislators receive, on average, per year, $75 more per capita
in discretionary spending (about 7% more). This effect is present only for the majority party
members, which is in line with the previous work showing that control of the Congress gives
legislative advantages (Albouy 2013). We also find that the rewards for discipline are larger
(by 25%) in the districts in which the constituents’ preferences are not aligned with the party
line, in particular, in conservative-leaning districts represented by Democrats and in liberal-
leaning districts represented by Republicans. These findings are in line with our theoretical
model, according to which representatives face a tougher trade-off in those districts and thus
demand higher rewards for supporting the party line.
From a more general perspective, our study emphasizes the impacts of party loyalty on
federal spending while the existing literature has mainly focused on the political consequences
of party discipline. This emphasis allows us to disclose additional sources of uneven distri-
bution of federal grants, namely, representatives’ loyalty to party lines and conflict between
constituents’ and party interests. Therefore, our findings complement the existing literature
and suggest that various studies on federal spending may benefit from taking party discipline
and conflict intensity into account.
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Appendix
A Additional tables
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics (only majority party members).
Variable Mean St.Dev. Min Max
High-variation spending per capita 1057.98 2079.73 0 29414.13
Low-variation spending per capita 3682.22 1135.51 182.19 20474.98
Loyal 0.46 0.50 0 1
Conflict 0.25 0.43 0 1
President’s party 0.32 0.47 0 1
State presidential margin 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.50
Majority party leadership 0.01 0.09 0 1
Committee chair 0.09 0.29 0 1
Appropriations committee 0.15 0.36 0 1
Ways and means committee 0.10 0.30 0 1
Close election 0.05 0.23 0 1
Republican 0.41 0.49 0 1
First term 0.15 0.35 0 1
Seniority 5.47 4.13 1 28
Log(population) 13.32 0.12 12.90 13.87
Capital 0.21 0.41 0 1
30
Table A.2: Party discipline and spending: minority party districts.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loyal 9.05 8.61 9.38 9.04
(19.95) (20.12) (19.86) (20.06)
Conflict 126.09 134.91
(122.69) (126.76)
Loyal x conflict 51.11 49.67
(101.79) (103.30)
Log population -553.92 -565.93 -755.88* -733.96
(361.89) (362.64) (449.29) (454.45)
Capital -85.55 -85.73 -78.14 -77.82
(146.80) (147.06) (145.21) (145.38)
President’s party -33.17 -73.84 -45.76 -87.29
(88.78) (92.78) (97.84) (98.97)
State presidential margin -55.49 -56.67 -183.76 -193.54
(211.58) (210.50) (232.12) (230.68)
Ranking minority member 70.94 71.49 75.32 75.71
(66.17) (66.27) (65.91) (66.03)
Committee chair 15.94 15.96 35.36 35.62
(110.81) (111.05) (101.02) (101.68)
Appropriations committee -8.55 -5.03 -4.92 -1.34
(34.59) (34.95) (33.13) (33.48)
Ways and Means committee -12.78 -12.92 -6.85 -6.54
(54.86) (56.28) (53.51) (55.09)
Close election 98.53*** 94.78*** 101.66*** 97.74***
(35.65) (33.32) (35.80) (33.36)
Republican -136.68 -202.81 -151.60 -222.33
(106.08) (152.25) (112.09) (158.28)
First term -15.40 -15.89 -8.75 -9.08
(29.42) (29.35) (28.83) (28.76)
Seniority 1.10 1.19 1.75 1.83
(4.42) (4.43) (4.21) (4.21)
Constant 8767.26* 8972.06* -591777.61*** -506865.55**
(4824.46) (4833.19) (228627.92) (231061.11)
Regional trends No No Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.095 0.095 0.098 0.099
Observations 4582 4582 4582 4582
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications
include year and district by census fixed effects. Dependent variable = High-Variance (i.e., discretionary) spending
per capita. Loyal =1 if legislator’s unity score is above the party median. Conflict =1 for Republican legislators
representing liberal-leaning districts or Democrat legislators representing conservative-leaning districts. Districts with
multiple occupants and districts represented by members in the majority are excluded.
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Table A.3: Party discipline and discretionary spending in majority versus minority districts.
Conflict=1 Conflict=0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Loyal -260.84 -281.54 -1.58 -1.55
(201.98) (203.09) (26.44) (26.44)
Majority party 41.39 42.60 92.92** 93.57**
(51.76) (51.06) (38.68) (38.96)
Loyal × Majority party 550.64* 560.53* 22.62 22.67
(304.84) (299.63) (37.77) (37.82)
Regional trends No Yes No Yes
Restricted sample No No No No
Adj. R2 0.095 0.101 0.126 0.126
Observations 2185 2185 8200 8200
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses, ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications include year and district by census fixed effects.
Dependent variable = High-Variance (i.e., discretionary) spending per capita. Loyal
= 1 if legislator’s unity score is above the party median. Districts with multiple
occupants are excluded.Conflict = 1 for Republican legislators who represent liberal-
leaning districts or Democrat legislators who represent conservative-leaning districts.
Additional controls added in all models: log(population), capital, president’s party,
state presidential margin, close election, majority party leadership, committee chair,
appropriations committee, ways and means committee, first term, and seniority (see
Table 3).
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B Politician’s Maximization Problem and Proof of Lemma 3.1
Given that F ′ (·) > 0, the politician chooses policy x ∈ [0, l] to maximize
l2 − x2 + max
[
l2 − (l − x)2 + α, 0
]
,
which for α ≥ 0 amounts to
l2 − x2 + l2 − (l − x)2 + α;
for −l2 ≤ α < 0 amounts to{
l2 − x2 + l2 − (l − x)2 + α if x ≥ l −√l2 + α,
l2 − x2 if x < l −√l2 + α;
(8)
and for α < −l2 amounts to
l2 − x2.
We consider first the case of α ≥ 0. In this case, the politician chooses the policy
x (α) = arg max
x∈[0,l]
[
l2 − x2 + l2 − (l − x)2 + α
]
= l2
and gets reappointed with probability
F
(
l2 − ( l2)2 + l2 − (l − l2)2 + α) = F (32 l2 + α) .
We turn next to the case of −l2 ≤ α < 0. In this case, (8) is decreasing in x if l2 ≤
l−√l2 + α (which amounts to −l2 ≤ α ≤ −34 l2). It follows that x (α) = 0 for −l2 ≤ α ≤ −34 l2.
However, if l2 > l −
√
l2 + α (which amounts to −34 l2 < α < 0) there are two candidates
for maximum, x = l2 and x = 0. Evaluating (8) in x =
l
2 and x = 0 yields
3
2 l
2 + α and l2,
respectively. It follows that the politician chooses x (α) = l2 when
3
2 l
2+α ≥ l2 (which amounts
to −12 l2 ≤ α < 0), and x (α) = 0 when 32 l2 + α < l2 (which amounts to −34 l2 < α < −12 l2).
Her reelection probability is equal to F
(
3
2 l
2 + α
)
and F
(
l2
)
, respectively.
Finally, we analyze the case of α < −l2. In this case, the politician chooses the policy
x (α) = arg max
x∈[0,l]
[
l2 − x2] = 0
and gets reelected with probability F
(
l2
)
.
It follows that the politician picks the following policy:
x (α) =
{
l
2 if α ≥ −12 l2,
0 if α < −12 l2.
Her reelection probability is equal to
Pr (α) =
{
F
(
3
2 l
2 + α
)
if α ≥ −12 l2,
F
(
l2
)
if α < −12 l2.
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